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RECENT DECISIONS

LABOR LAW EXISTENCE OF LABOR DISPUTE UNDER NORRIS-LA
GUARDIA ACT RELATION OF NORRIS-LA GUARDIA ACT TO SHERMAN ACT
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Action was brought in a federal court to enjoin the Chicago local of the

A. F. of L. Mille Wagon Drivers' Union from picketing and committing acts
of violence in violation of the Sherman Act 1 against retail stores that sold milk
produced out of the state, processed by the plaintiff dairies and distributed by
"vendors" belonging to the plaintiff C. I. 0. union of dairy workers. "Vendors"
were individuals owning their own trucks who purchased milk from the dairies
and sold it to the retail stores, which charged prices lower than those charged
for millc supplied by dairies employing the A. F. of L. drivers. Defendant's objects were to compel the dairies to abandon the "vendor system," which threatened the wage level of its members and to secure the membership of the "vendors" on condition that they cease distributing milk in that capacity. Held, there
existed a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,2 and therefore the
procedural requirements of that act have to be satisfied before any injunction
can issue to restrain conduct which violates the Sherman Act. Milk Wagon
Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, (U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 122.
The determination that a labor dispute exists where the controversy relates
to a method of doing business may seem at first appearance an extreme holding. 8
Yet when the emphasis is placed not upon the technical relationship of the
"vendors" to the plaintiff dairies 4 but upon the relationship of the "vendors' "
function to the state of working conditions in the rest of the industry,5 the
26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S. C. (1934), §§ 1-7.
47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S. C. (1934), §§ 101-II5.
3 The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that a case involves a labor dispute when it
involves persons engaged in the same industry or when it involves any conflicting interests in a "labor dispute" of "persons participating or interested" therein. 47 Stat. L.
73, § 13(a) (1932), 29 U. S. C. (1934), § II3(a). The term "labor dispute" is
defined as including any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment or
concerning the association or representation of persons for bargaining over the terms
or conditions of employment. 47 Stat. L. 73, § 13(c) (1932), 29 U.S. C. (1934),
§ 113(c). Compare Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 222 Wis. 383,268 N. W.
270, 872 (1936), affd. 301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857 (1937) (picketing to compel employer to sign union agreement including provision that he refrain from doing
certain work himself}; and Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d)
674 (1937) (picketing to compel plaintiff to rehire a movie projectionist where
plaintiff himself had taken over the duties).
4 The notion that the "vendors" had the status of independent contractors was as
a matter of fact weakened by evidence that the plaintiff dairies regarded the "vendors"
as employees. Principal case, 61 S. Ct. 122 at 126.
~ The "vendors" were performing the same work as the A. F. of L. drivers, and,
as found by the master for the trial court, under conditions below the wage and hour
standards of the A. F. of L. drivers. Principal case, 61 S. Ct. 122 at 125.
i
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case has the aspects of an ordinary labor controversy.6 Where a case involves a
labor dispute, the Norris-La Guardia Act prevails over the Sherman Act 1 in
view of the obvious purpose of Congress in passing the anti-injunction statute 8
and the express provision embodied in it. 9 As a consequence no injunction can
be obtained against a labor union accused of violating the Sherman Act without
first complying with the procedural prerequisites to an injunction under the
Norris-La Guardia Act,1° and even then no injunction can be had against any
activities enumerated in section 4 of that statute.11 Still a union, though it employs only peaceful strikes or picketing to carry out a conspiracy in restraint of
commerce,12 may be subject to a civil action for damages or criminal prosecution,18 since the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not purport to deal with substantive law.u. To obviate such a result there are three possible theories. The NorrisLaGuardia Act may be interpreted as rendering lawful by implication the activities set out jn section 4; 15 or the Clayton Act,16 which deals with substantive law,
6 Compare New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58
S. Ct. 703 (1938). In so far as the principal case involved a controversy between two
unions, the finding of a labor dispute accords with the decision in Fur Workers
Union, Local No. 7z v. Fur Workers Union No. z1z38, {App. D. C. 1939) 105 F.
(2d) 1, a:ffd. per curiam 308 U. S. 522, 60 S. Ct. 292 (1939), noted in 38 MICH.
L. REV. 1325 (1940).
7 Defendant's activities probably did not constitute a violation of the Sherman
Act, on the authority of Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, z89 U. S. 103, 53 S. Ct.
549 (1933), and Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940),
but the Court in the view it took of the principal case did not have to pass upon the
matter.
8 Principal case, 61 S. Ct. uz at 1z7 ff. The criticism that arose after the emasculatory treatment given by the courts to the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. L. 738, § 20
(1914), 29 U. S. C. (1934), § 52, which was the first federal legislation to modify
procedure governing labor injunctions, led to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. See FRANKFURTER and GREENE, THE LmoR INJUNCTION 165 ff. (1930).
9 47 Stat. L. 71, § 5 (193z), 29 U. S. C. (1934), § 105. This section specifically deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions against parties to a
labor dispute on the ground that they are engaged in an unlawful conspiracy because
of the doing of acts set out in section 4 of the statute.
10 47 Stat. L. 71, §§ 7-9 (1932), 29 U.S. C. (1934), §§ 107-109.
11 47 Stat. L. 70, § 4 (1932), 29 U, S. C. (1934), § 104. Included in the protection of this section are striking and non-violent, non-fraudulent picketing.
12 Such a situation is presented by Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters' Assn., z74 U.S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 5zz (19z7).
18 The remedies provided in sections I and 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat.
L. 209, §§ 1, 7 (1890), as amended by 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S. C. (1934),
§§ I, 15.
14 United States v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local Union, (D. C. D. C.
1940) 32 F. Supp. 594 at 600; 49 YALE L. J. 518 at 529 (1940).
15 This was the view taken in United States v. Hutcheson, (D. C. Mo. 1940)
3z F. Supp. 594 at 600, which is before the Supreme Court this term, 8 U. S. LAw
WEEK 726, 730 (1940). The court relied on language in New Negro Alliance v.
Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 at 562, 58 S. Ct. 703 (1938). The theory is
criticized by Gregory, "Labor's Coercive Activities under the Sherman Act," 7 UNIV.
CHI. L. REv. 347 at 357 (1940).
16 38 Stat. L. 738, § 20 (1914), z9 U. S. C. (1934), § 52: "nor shall any of
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may be injected with new vigor; 17 or the device of peaceful picketing may,
on the theory of Thornhill v . .dlabama,18 be regarded as privileged.19 It is
questionable, however, whether any group should be exempted from the Sherman Act if it is actually engaged in a conspiracy which violates that act. Whether
the means employed are lawful or not, the evils at which the Sherman Act is
aimed exist if the effect is a restraint of interstate commerce.20
Philip W. Buchen

the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law
of the United States."
17 See the dissenting opinions in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443 at 479, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921), and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen
Stone Cutters Assn., 274 U.S. 37 at 56, 47 S. Ct. 522 (1927), for a more liberal view
of what activities are protected by the Clayton Act.
18 310 U.S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
19 However, the constitutional right to peaceful picketing is undoubtedly subject
to reasonable restrictions through the exercise of the police power over interstate commerce, such as represented by the Sherman Act. See 39 MICH. L. REv. I IO at I 19
(1940).
20 With the application of the Sherman Act to labor activities restricted, the need
will pass for protecting labor in its use of strikes and picketing from civil damage suits
and criminal punishment under the Sherman Act. See 39 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1940).

